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Abstract 
Using detailed product-level export data for China and a variant of the Antràs and Helpman (2004) 
model that includes investments in component search, we examine the sectoral determinants of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) versus foreign outsourcing in export processing trade. We exploit the 
coexistence of two regulatory export processing regimes in China, which specify who owns and 
controls the imported components for export processing. We find that in the regime that Chinese 
plants own the imported components, the share of exports from vertically integrated plants is 
increasing in the intensity of headquarter inputs across sectors, and is decreasing in the contractibility 
of inputs. These results are consistent with the property- rights theory of intra-firm trade. However, in 
the regime that foreign firms own the imported components, no significant relationship is found 
between the prevalence of vertical integration, headquarter intensity and input contractibility across 
sectors. The positive relationship between productivity dispersion and the export share of integrated 
plants across sectors, as suggested by the existing literature, is found only in the regime that foreign 
firms own the imported components. These results are consistent with our model, which considers 
ownership of imported components as an alternative to asset ownership to alleviate the hold-up 
problem by the export-processing plant. 
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1 Introduction
Using detailed product-level trade data from Chinas Customs and a variant of the Antràs and
Helpman (2004) model that includes investments in component search, this paper studies the rel-
ative prevalence of FDI versus outsourcing in export processing trade. Although there is a large
and growing theoretical literature that applies the theory of the rm to study the determinants
of intrarm trade, empirical evidence is relatively scant and exclusively focuses on the developed
world.1 By exploiting the coexistence of the two export processing regimes in China, which desig-
nate by law the owner of the imported materials, we add to the empirical literature on validating
the predictions of the theory on incomplete contracting, organizational structure and international
trade. In particular, we use data of the input suppliers in a developing country to examine the
sectoral determinants of FDI and arms-length trade according to the property-rights theory of the
rm.2 Our results complement the existing empirical literature that has so far provided empirical
evidence from the headquarters side in developed countries.
Export processing has been an important part of Chinas recent economic development. It
accounted for more than half of its exports in recent years.3 Chinese export processing plants
have been governed under two regulatory regimes since the early 1980s, which are referred to
as pure-assembly and import-and-assembly. The main di¤erence between the two regimes lies
in the allocation of control rights and ownership of the imported inputs. Specically, under the
pure-assembly regime, a foreign rm supplies components to a Chinese plant who processes them
into nished products. The foreign rm retains ownership of the imported inputs throughout the
production process. Under the import-and-assembly regime, on the other hand, an assembly plant
in China imports inputs of its own accord. The assembly plant owns the inputs and reserves the
option of using the imported inputs for export processing for other foreign clients.
We exploit this special regulatory feature in China, which allows us to observe who owns and
controls the imported materials in a joint production relationship, to better understand the preva-
lence of FDI versus foreign outsourcing. The premise is that di¤erent allocation arrangements of
control rights and ownership of imported inputs across the two trade regimes can a¤ect the or-
ganizational choices by the foreign clients, and thus shape the pattern of trade across industries.
To guide our empirical analysis on the organizational structure of international trade and deepen
our understanding of export processing, we extend the Antràs and Helpman (2004) North-South
trade model with heterogeneous rms to incorporate investment decisions in imported component
search. The extension involves the nal-good producer in the North searching for inputs inter-
nationally under pure-assembly; whereas the assembly plant in the South conducting the search
under import-and-assembly. When the terms of investments cannot be fully specied in contracts
ex ante, both parties of the joint production unit anticipate Nash bargaining over the surplus from
1Seminal work includes McLaren (2000), Antràs (2003, 2005), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005),
Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008). See Helpman (2006) for a summary of the theoretical literature, and Hummels
et al. (2001) for the evidence of the tremendous growth of trade in intermediate inputs. More recent studies include
Conconi et al. (2008) and Ornelas and Turner (2009), among others.
2We take the property-rights approach to study the determinants of vertical integration. The determinants of
multinational rm boundaries can be analyzed by other theories of the rm. Existing research has applied the
incentive-systems approach of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), and the authority-delegation approach of Aghion and
Tirole (1997) to study the general equilibrium patterns of foreign integration and outsourcing. For the incentive-
systems approach, see Grossman and Helpman (2004), among others. For the authority-delegation approach, see
Marin and Verdier (2008, 2009) and Puga and Treer (2003), among others.
3To promote export-led growth, the Chinese government o¤ers tari¤ exemption on imported materials for export-
processing plants, as long as the entire output is exported. See section 2 for more details.
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the relationship, and underinvest in their corresponding activities as in the classic hold-up situation
à la Grossman and Hart (1986). When ownership over imported inputs o¤ers the owner a higher
outside option to use the inputs or the associated intangible asset with a third party when bar-
gaining fails, the optimal production mode may involve allocating ownership of both the imported
inputs and the plants assets to the party whose investments are more important for production.
Our heterogeneous-rm model predicts the coexistence of vertical integration and outsourcing in
both import-and-assembly and pure-assembly regimes in a sector for which headquarter investments
are su¢ ciently important. Under import-and-assembly, the export share of integrated rms is
increasing in headquarter intensity across sectors, consistent with the predictions by Antràs (2003).
Under pure-assembly, the relationship between sectoral headquarter intensity and the prevalence
of integration is ambiguous. The reason is that when expected hold-up by the assembly plant
intensies, a foreign client can choose to either own imported inputs or the plant to alleviate the
hold-up problem. The optimal organizational structure depends on whether the relative gain of
owning assets is larger than that of owning imported inputs or not. Under these circumstances, when
headquarter investments become more important, some rms switch from import-and-assembly to
outsourcing under pure-assembly, while some rms under pure-assembly switch from outsourcing to
integration. The net impact on the composition of organizational structures in the pure-assembly
regime would depend on the sensitivity of the two "switching" margins to the change in headquarter
intensity.
We examine these theoretical predictions using detailed product-level trade data collected by
Chinas Customs. In particular, for each trade regime, we regress the share of exports from vertically
integrated plants in total exports at the HS 6-digit level on various measures of the intensity of
headquarters inputs. For the import-and-assembly regime, we nd a positive relationship between
the share of integrated plantsexports and the intensity of headquarters inputs (skill, R&D and
capital-equipment). The results are robust when we restrict exports only to the U.S. and to di¤erent
country groups based on income levels, as well as when country xed e¤ects are controlled for.
For exports under the pure-assembly regime, no signicant relationship is found between the de-
gree of headquarter intensity and integrated plantsexports. For the same regime, we nd evidence
that productivity dispersion and the export share of integrated plants are positively correlated
across sectors. These results are consistent with the baseline case of our model when only the most
productive rms integrate with assembly plants under pure-assembly.
In the incomplete contracting framework, besides headquarter intensity, the extent to which
investments are contractible is also important for foreign rmsintegration decisions. Antràs and
Helpman (2008) consider partial contractibility of investments based on their original model (Antràs
and Helpman, 2004), and obtain ambiguous predictions of an improvement in contractibility of
investments on the propensity to integrate. We thus examine the e¤ects of contractibility of in-
vestments across sectors, and nd that in industries with higher values of headquarter intensity, an
increase in contractibility of the suppliers inputs is associated with a lower share of exports from
integrated plants under import-and-assembly. Once again, we nd no signicant relationship under
pure-assembly.
Our paper is closely related to Feenstra and Hanson (2005) who investigate theoretically and
empirically the prevalence of di¤erent ownership structures of export processing plants in China
based on the property-rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986). They nd that the most common
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outcome is to have foreign factory ownership but Chinese control over input purchases. They rec-
oncile these ndings with a model, which predicts that allocating ownership of assets and imported
components to di¤erent parties tends to be optimal when value-added in processing activities is
higher. They also explore the regional variation in China to show that this split ownership struc-
ture is most common in southern coastal provinces where export markets are thicker and courts
are relatively e¢ cient.
We instead focus on a strand of the literature that studies the relationship between indus-
try characteristics, productivity heterogeneity and the relative prevalence of vertical integration
(Antràs, 2003, Antràs and Helpman, 2004, 2008). This literature so far abstracted from the discus-
sion on control rights of imported components, which are particularly relevant for export processing
in developing countries. We thus extend the model by Antràs and Helpman (2004) to include in-
vestments in component search for assembly and examine the models predictions using Chinese
data. Moreover, our theoretical prediction of higher protability of concentrated ownership in more
headquarter-intensive sectors is consistent with the multi-task framework of Holmstrom and Mil-
grom (1994), who postulate that it is optimal to assign incentive-complementary tasks to the same
agent in a relationship.
Using data from a developing country, our paper complements the existing empirical studies
on the determinants of arms-length trade versus FDI in developed countries. Antràs (2003),
Yeaple (2006), Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2008), and Nunn and Treer (2008a,b) are
important precursors in this literature. They examine the e¤ect of headquarters inputs, productivity
dispersion and contractibility of inputs on U.S. intrarm imports as a share of total U.S. imports.
Bernard et al. (2008) also include interactions between industry factor intensity and country factor
abundance and a new measure of product contractibility based on the importance of intermediaries
in international trade. Nunn and Treer (2008b) in a recent paper explore the varying degree of
relationship specicity of di¤erent kinds of physical capital and use new data to account for the
fact that a share of U.S. intrarm imports are shipped from foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries.
Recent studies examine empirically the e¤ects of rm-level characteristics on the propensity to
integrate. Defever and Toubal (2007) and Corcos et al. (2008) provide evidence from France, while
Kohler and Smolka (2009) provide evidence from Spain. These studies nd empirical support for
the predictions of productivity ranking across production modes that involve di¤erent ownership
arrangements.4
In these empirical studies, imports within multinationalsboundaries are assumed to be shipped
from foreign subsidiaries to the headquarters. However, it has been argued that a signicant share
of the intrarm imports originates from the foreign headquarters of the U.S. subsidiaries, especially
from rich countries (Nunn and Treer, 2008b). Our paper considers exports from export processing
assembly plants who produce solely for sales in countries where the headquarters are located.
By focusing on exports from the subsidiaries to the multinational headquarters, we hope to obtain
cleaner results to validate the existing theoretical models, which have so far placed sourcing decisions
by the headquarters in the North at the center of analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses briey the background of export processing
in China. Section 3 develops the theoretical framework for our empirical investigation. Section 4
4Defever and Toubal nd that the most productive rms tend to outsource, while Corcos et al. nd that the least
productive ones outsource. Their ndings are both consistent with Antràs and Helpman (2004), but require di¤erent
assumptions about the ranking of xed costs associated with di¤erent organizational structures.
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describes our data source. Section 5 empirically examines our theoretical predictions. The last
section concludes.
2 Export Processing in China
In hopes of obtaining foreign technology, boosting employment and economic growth, China im-
plemented various policies to promote exports and foreign direct investments since the early 1980s
when economic reforms started. One of the key policies is to provide tax incentives to encourage
export processing trade, which has been regulated by Chinas Customs under two regimes: pure-
assembly and import-and-assembly.5 Since then, export processing has been a main driver of the
impressive growth of Chinas foreign trade. Table 1 shows that export processing accounted for
about 55 percent of the volume of total exports from China in 2005, and more than 80 percent of
foreign-invested enterprisesexports. Among export processing trade, import-and-assembly is more
prevalent. As Table 2 shows, 78 percent of export processing exports was from the import-and-
assembly regime, under which the Chinese assembly plants retain ownership over imported inputs.
Of these import-and-assembly exports, 76 percent was exported from the foreign-invested plants.
Of the pure-assembly exports, on the other hand, foreign a¢ liates accounted for about 44 percent.
In short, foreign ownership is more prevalent in the import-and-assembly regime, compared to
pure-assembly, as pointed out by Feenstra and Hanson (2005).
Chinese assembly plants and their foreign clients play di¤erent roles under the two regimes.
Under pure-assembly, a foreign nal-good producer supplies a Chinese assembly plant with inter-
mediate inputs from abroad. The plant then assembles these inputs into nal products, which are
shipped to the foreign client for sales abroad. It is important to note that under this regime, the
foreign client owns the inputs throughout the production process. To obtain a license from Chinas
Customs for trading under this regime, the terms of the transactions need to be specied in written
contracts, and to be presented to the Chinese authority in advance for approval.6
Under import-and-assembly, the Chinese plant plays a more active role. Instead of passively
receiving materials from the foreign client, an assembly plant searches for intermediate inputs
for assembly processing. Importantly, the assembly plant retains ownership of the imported inputs
throughout the production process. Di¤erent from a pure-assembly plant, it may purchase the same
kind of inputs and use them with multiple foreign rms. To obtain permission to trade under this
regime, assembly plants need to maintain a higher standard of accounting practices and warehouse
facilities, relative to a pure-assembly plant. Application for operating a plant under import-and-
assembly is generally more di¢ cult. Plants are required to make investments in warehouse facilities,
inventory and accounting systems (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005).
There are several important di¤erences between the two regimes that matter for both our model
and empirical analysis. The rst di¤erence is related to the responsibilities of the Chinese plant,
and therefore its investments in human capital. Under pure-assembly, the main role of a Chinese
manager is routine assembling. Under import-and-assembly, the plant manager is responsible for
5Since imports are duty-free, rms have a great incentive to apply to operate their production units under either of
the regimes. Therefore, Chinas customs is particularly restrictive about the use of imported materials by the Chinese
export-processing plants. Monthly reports need to be delivered to the customs to show that imported materials are
used solely for export processing.
6Readers are referred to Naughton (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) for a more detailed description about
the two regulatory regimes.
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purchasing materials from abroad and arranging them to be shipped to China. After the shipment,
she needs to manage the inventory, and maintain a high standard of warehouse facilities and
accounting systems.
The second di¤erence is about the ownership of materials. Under pure-assembly, the Chinese
plant has no ownership of imported inputs and her outside option is low. Under import-and-
assembly, the plant owns the imported inputs, and can use the inputs for multiple foreign clients.
Her outside option is therefore relatively higher. The third di¤erence has to do with the approval
standard. Since import-and-assembly plants are allowed to use domestic inputs together with the
imported ones for production, getting approval is generally more di¢ cult. Certain accounting
procedures have to be consistently maintained, as value-added taxes can potentially be rebated for
inputs that are used entirely for exports. Importantly, transition from one regime to another is
quite costly under these circumstances.
3 A Theoretical Model
3.1 Model Setup
To guide our empirical analysis that involves four production modes, we extend the North-South
trade model with heterogeneous rms by Antràs and Helpman (2004). Specically, we include
investment decisions for component search activities in processing trade. At a conceptual level,
ownership of components should have similar "incentivizing" e¤ects provided by asset ownership.
Our theoretical model aims at providing a formal analysis of the determinants of the organizational
structure of multinational production when ownership of imported inputs and the plantsassets
are to be chosen.
Consider an environment in which all consumers have the same constant elasticity-of-substitution
preferences over a number of di¤erentiated products. A rm that produces a brand of a di¤erenti-
ated product faces the following demand function
q = Dp 
1
1  ; 0 <  < 1
where p and q stand for price and quantity, respectively; D measures the demand level for the
di¤erentiated products in the rms sector; and  is a parameter that determines the demand
elasticity of the brand.7
In our model, production requires non-cooperative investments by the nal-good producer (H)
in the North and the assembly plant (A) in the South. Specically, nal goods are produced with
three inputs, component activities m, assembly activities a and headquarter services h, according
to the following production function:
q = 

m
m
m  a
a
a  h
h
h
; (1)
7As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), the utility function that delivers such a demand function for a rm is
U = q0 +
1

JX
j=1
Z
i2

qj (i)
 di
 

,
where q0 is consumption of a homogenous good; j is an index representing a di¤erentiated product; i is an index
representing a particular brand,  is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
di¤erentiated products, where  is assumed to be smaller than :
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where  is rm productivity, 0 < m < 1, 0 < a < 1 and h = 1   m   a.8 All 0s are sector-
specic parameters. A higher value of k implies a more intensive use of factor k. In the context
of export processing, a is always chosen by A in the South, while h is always chosen by H in the
North. The unit cost of h is wN , while that of a is wS < wN . Depending on the trade regime
under which the production unit operates, either A or H can invest in component search. Under
pure-assembly, H invests in both headquarter activities (h) and component search (m), while A
invests only in assembly activities (a). The unit cost of component search activities is N . Under
import-and-assembly, H invests in h, while A invests in both a and m. The unit cost of component
search is S . For the moment, 
0
s are assumed to be identical across trade regimes.
For simplicity, we limit our analysis on Hs decisions between foreign outsourcing and foreign
vertical integration (i.e., FDI), and ignore all domestic sourcing modes. Irrespective of the trade
regime, components m are always purchased and shipped from outside As location, reecting what
the Chinese government requires export processing plants to do. A foreign client H can choose to
source assembly tasks either under the pure-assembly regime (N) or under the import-and-assembly
regime (S). Within each regime, she can choose to outsource (O) to an assembly plant, or integrate
(V ) with it. In sum, there are four production modes that H can choose to operate her production
unit. They are NV , NO, SV and SO.
The timing of events is as follows. First, a potential nal-good producer (H) pays a xed cost to
enter the market and draw rm productivity . If the expected operating prots are negative, she
exits the market; otherwise, she chooses one of the four production modes. Di¤erent xed costs are
incurred depending on the choice of production mode. After that, H is randomly matched with an
assembly plant (A) in the South. Anticipating ex post bargaining, both H and A then undertake
non-contractible investments in inputs (a, h and m). Who invests in activities in component search
(m) depends on the type of trade regime H chooses ex ante. After the production of inputs, H
and A bargain over the division of surplus in a Nash bargaining game. If they agree to continue
the relationship, components m are shipped from abroad to A, which are then assembled with
assembly inputs a to produce nished products. Finally, the nished products are exported to H
in the North for sales, which require headquarter services h.
As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), we model the bargaining process as a generalized Nash
bargaining game, with a constant fraction  2 (0; 1) representing the primitive bargaining power
of H, and with 1   being the primitive bargaining power of A.
3.2 Equilibrium
We solve the model backwards for the subgame-perfect equilibrium for a given rm, taking sector-
level variables as given. We derive a number of testable hypotheses related to the prevalence of
FDI across sectors that are specic to export processing in China. Based on the demand function
specied above, revenue of the joint production unit between the nal-good producer and the
assembly plant is given by
R (m;a; h) = D1 

m
m
m  a
a
a  h
h
h
:
At the bargaining stage, the outside option of each party and therefore the ex post surplus from
the relationship depends on both the organizational form (V or O) and the trade regime (N or
8One can think of a, m and h as quality-adjusted e¤ect units of inputs, with all quantities normalized to 1.
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S). Di¤erent outside options in turn a¤ect the de-facto shares of the surplus between the foreign
rm and the assembly plant. We now discuss the resulting surplus distribution under di¤erent
production modes.
3.2.1 Pure-Assembly
Under pure-assembly, H has control rights and ownership of the components (m). Vertical integra-
tion gives H the right to re the manager A and seize her relationship-specic inputs. If bargaining
breaks down, H uses these inputs to assemble the components into nished products. Following
Antràs and Helpman (2004), we assume that after ring A, there is an e¢ ciency loss because A
has relationship-specic capital and is more productive than an outside manager. As such, H can
complete only a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the original output, which implies an outside option equal
to discounted revenue R < R. Since As investments are tailored specically to H, her outside
option is 0.9
Now consider outsourcing under pure-assembly. As outside option is again equal to 0. Without
asset ownership, H can no longer seize As assets if bargaining fails. Suppose Hs investments are
completely specic to A. H 0s outside option is also 0.10
Let us denote Hs expected payo¤ under the integration mode by NVR, with the remaining
share of the revenue going to A. Similarly, under the outsourcing mode, Hs expected payo¤ is
NOR. The above analysis on the outside options of each party implies
NV = [ (1  ) + ] > NO = :
Solving the maximization problems of H and A gives operating prots of the joint production
unit as Nk = D Nk   wNNk (see appendix), where k 2 fV;Og,  = 

1  and Nk is the
xed cost (in terms of Norths labor) associated with organization mode k under pure-assembly.
Importantly, the multiplicative part of the revenue that is sensitive to investment levels, and thus
the choice of production mode, is
 Nk =
1   Nkh + Nkm + (1  Nk) a
1


wN
Nk
h 
wS
1 Nk
a 
N
Nk
m 1  :
3.2.2 Import-and-Assembly
We now turn to the analysis of the ex post distribution of surplus under import-and-assembly. We
follow Feenstra and Hanson (2005) and assume that A0s investments in component search activities
give her a positive outside option. It can be because A acquires expertise and develops business
networks from these investments, which allow her to serve as a potential partner for another nal-
good producer in the North. For simplicity, we assume that As outside option is equal to a fraction
of the original revenue, R < R.
If H chooses to integrate with A, she can seize As inputs and complete her production with
a third-party plant if bargaining fails. Hs outside option is once again R < R. We focus on
internal solutions and assume that  +  < 1:
9 If inputs are only partially specic to the relationship, As outside option needs not be 0. This assumption is to
simplify analysis, and the main insight of the paper is independent of the assumption of complete specicity.
10Antràs and Helpman (2008) allow for partial specicity, which we will allow in our regression analysis.
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If H chooses outsourcing, she has no ownership of either As assets or components. Her outside
option will be equal to 0, while As outside option will be R, similar to the case of integration
under import-and-assembly.
Let us denote Hs expected payo¤ under integration and outsourcing within this regime by
SVR and SOR, respectively. The dependence of the outside options on the organization modes
implies
SV = [ (1     ) + ] > SO =  (1  ) .
Notice that for a given organization mode, A obtains a larger de facto bargaining power under
import-and-assembly because of her experience and business network acquired from searching for
components.
Solving the maximization problems of H and A gives operating prots of the joint production
unit as Sk = D Sk   wNSk (see appendix), where k and  are as above, and Sk is the xed
cost associated with organization mode k under import-and-assembly, and
 Sk =
1   Skh + (1  Sk)  1  h
1


wN
Sk
h 
wS
1 Sk
a 
S
1 Sk
m 1  :
3.2.3 Choosing Optimal Production Modes
If xed costs are all identical, the model predicts that all foreign rms choose outsourcing in
assembly-intensive sectors (high a), and integration in headquarter-intensive sectors (high h).11
However, we observe di¤erent organizational forms across sectors from the data. Moreover, in
practice, di¤erent organizational modes appear to be associated with di¤erent set-up costs. We
now consider xed costs of production that vary across production modes.
We assume that H has to incur an identical xed cost of entry  (in terms of Norths labor).
Conditional on productivity that is su¢ cient to guarantee non-negative expected operating prots,
H chooses a trade regime (N or S) and an organizational form (V or O) for its operation. We
denote by fk the xed costs for organizational form k, where k 2 fV;Og. The ranking of fk is non-
trivial. On the one hand, more management e¤ort is needed to monitor overseas employees in an
integrated rm. On the other hand, there may exist economies of scope over managerial activities
under vertical integration. Following Antràs and Helpman (2004), we assume that managerial
overload from managing overseas employees o¤sets the cost advantage arising from the economies
of scope of these activities (i.e., fV > fO).
We denote by gl the xed costs for operations under trade regime l, where l 2 fN;Sg. We assume
that pure-assembly is associated with a higher xed cost compared with import-and-assembly (i.e.,
gN > gS). This assumption requires that establishing a logistic and transport network between the
assembly plant and its overseas supplier involves a signicant xed cost.12 Moreover, we assume
11 If we derive the optimal lk that maximizes joint surplus (solving
d lk
dlk
= 0 for l 2 fN;Sg ; k 2 fV;Og) we obtain
the folowing. Under import-and-assembly, SV > SO > 

S
 
h

for an assembly-intensive sector, which implies
 SO >  SV . Similarly, under pure-assembly, NV > NO > 

N
 
h

for an assembly-intensive sector, which implies
 NO >  NV .
12Similar to the discussion about the xed costs for di¤erent organizational forms, economies of scale can lower the
transportation costs of components that come directly from the headquarter, instead from multiple suppliers. We
assume that these economies of scale are not su¢ cient to o¤set the cost saving from decentralization of component
purchasing.
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that overhead costs of transporting tangible goods are higher than those associated with managing
a subsidiary (i.e., gN > fV ) for our baseline analysis. Denoting the xed costs of production mode
kl by kl = fk + gl + , our assumptions imply the following ranking of total xed costs:
13
NV > NO > SV > SO: (2)
Conditional on staying in the market, H chooses the production mode to maximize expected
operating prots of the joint production unit before investments by each party as follows:


D; a; h

= max
l2fN;Sg;k2fV;Og
lk

D; a; h

.
Recall that through asset ownership, vertical integration always enhances the e¤ective share of
surplus in a given regime (i.e., NV > NO and SV > SO). Across regimes, the ranking of the de
facto shares is non-trivial. If ring the manager is very costly (low ) or if component ownership
can substantially enhance the owners outside option (high ), NO > SV . In developing countries,
the export processing plants manager usually plays a crucial role in managing and coordinating
local sta¤, and component ownership is an important determinant of the owners outside option.
Supporting these claims, Feenstra and Hanson (2005) argue that the predominance of outsourcing
under import-and-assembly in China (see Table 2) is a result of high shares of value-added of
processing activities conducted by workers there, which make split ownership over the plant and
imported components the optimal sourcing mode. Based on these arguments, we focus on the
following ranking of the 0s as our baseline case:14
NV > NO > SV > SO. (3)
The nal-good producers choices depend on  s and the xed costs s associated with di¤erent
production modes. Let us now turn to the discussion of the ranking of  s. As outsourcing provides
A with a higher incentive to invest, and is associated with a lower xed cost, outsourcing is always
the preferred organization mode within each trade regime in an assembly-intensive sector. Since
the xed cost for outsourcing under pure-assembly is higher than that under import-and-assembly
(i.e., NO > SO), H would consider pure-assembly if and only if nal-good producers command
a su¢ ciently large cost advantage over component search (i.e.,  NO >  SO). Readers are referred
to the appendix for a formal analysis on the conditions under which this inequality holds.
Importantly, in an assembly-intensive sector, if  NO >  SO, more productive rms would
choose pure-assembly whereas the less productive ones would choose import-and-assembly because
of the latters lower xed costs. Figure 1, which plots rm prots against rm productivity term
   1  , illustrates such a scenario under the ranking of xed costs specied in (2). On the
other hand, if assembly plants command a su¢ ciently large cost advantage over component search,
 SO >  NO, import-and-assembly is the only prevalent production mode.
13We assume that the total xed costs for each production mode are the sum of various xed costs. One can
argue that economies of scope can also arise from producing in an integrated rm under pure-assembly, and that
NV < SV and NV < NO. To simplify analysis, we do not explore these possibilities in this paper.
14 It is important to note that our testable hypotheses are independent of the assumption that NO > SV . We
make this assumption to obtain more tractable comparative statics.
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Figure 1: An assembly-intensive sector when  NO   SO
In a headquarter-intensive sector, both integration and outsourcing can be optimal organiza-
tion modes. Since control and ownership over the components give H extra incentive to invest
in headquarter services, pure-assembly is associated with a higher  than import-and-assembly.
Inequality (3) is then translated into  NV >  NO >  SV >  SO. Together with the ranking of
xed costs specied in (2), four production modes can coexist, as depicted in Figure 2. There
are four productivity cuto¤s determining the ranges of heterogeneous rms operating in di¤erent
production modes. Firms with productivity term 

1  below SO exit, those with productivity
parameter between SO and SV outsource under import-and-assembly, those with productivity
parameter between SV and NO integrate under import-and-assembly, those with productivity
parameter between NO and NV outsource under pure-assembly, and nally those with produc-
tivity parameter above NV integrate under pure-assembly. See the appendix for the expressions
of these cuto¤s.
To guide our empirical analysis, we now derive the expressions of the export share of integrated
plants under each trade regime. To obtain closed-form expressions of these shares, we follow
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to assume that  is distributed Pareto with shape parameter
, with a cumulative distribution function equal to G () = 1  

min


, where  > 2 and
  min > 0. Since no rms choose integration in an assembly-intensive sector, the market share
of integrated exports is 0.
In a headquarter-intensive sector, the export value from each of the four production modes is
positive under the benchmark case. In particular, total export volume of a headquarter-intensive
sector is
X = D [ SOV (SO;SV ) +  SV V (SV ;NO) +  NOV (NO;NV ) +  NV V (NV ;1)]
where
V (A;B) =
Z B
A
dG () =  
 
A1   B1  ;
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Figure 2: A headquarter-intensive sector
where   = 

min
 1 :
Under import-and-assembly, the export share of integrated assembly plants can be expressed
as (see appendix for details):
XSV
XSV +XSO
=
26641 +  SO SV
1 

SV
SO
1 
SV
SO
1    NOSO 1 

3775
 1
. (4)
In su¢ ciently headquarter-intensive sectors when all four production modes exist,  
lV =
 
lO
> 1
and is increasing in h for l 2 fN;Sg (see Antràs, 2003). Similarly, with the assumption that
NO > SV ,  NO= SV > 1 and is increasing in 
h for l 2 fN;Sg. As such, under import-and-
assembly, the market share of integrated assembly plants exports is increasing in h. This positive
relationship is consistent with the main prediction of Antràs (2003).
Under pure-assembly, the export share of integrated assembly rms is given by (see appendix
for details):
XNV
XNV +XNO
=
"
1 +
 NO
 NV
"
NO
NV
1 
  1
## 1
. (5)
It is shown in the appendix that under pure-assembly, the relationship between the export share
of integrated assembly plants and headquarter intensity is ambiguous. The main determinant of
the sign of the relationship is the respective change in the productivity cuto¤s NO and NV .
To understand the intuition of the ambiguity, consider a hypothetical exercise that production
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technology of a sector becomes more headquarter-intensive. On the one hand, the relatively more
productive headquarters in the North who used to integrate with their assembly plants under
import-and-assembly would switch to outsourcing under pure-assembly. On the other hand, the
relatively more productive nal-good producers in the North who used to outsource their production
under pure-assembly would switch to integration within the same regime. Thus, the composition
of export shares of the two organization modes under pure-assembly relies on the sensitivity of the
margins of production modes to an increase in headquarter intensity of production. In particular, if
the e¢ ciency gains (due to changes in the incentives to invest) by obtaining ownership of the plants
assets are greater than the loss of giving up control rights of imported materials when h increases,
the export share of integrated plants would increase (see appendix for details). This ambiguous
relationship between the share of integrated plants exports and headquarter intensity of inputs
under pure-assembly is specic to our model, which considers ownership of imported components
as an alternative to asset ownership to alleviate the hold-up problem by the export-processing
plant. We summarize the relationship between headquarter intensity and the prevalence of vertical
integration across sectors by the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Headquarter Intensity and the Prevalence of FDI Given the ranking of
xed costs of production as specied in (2), the share of exports of vertically integrated plants
is higher in the more headquarter-intensive sectors under the import-and-assembly regime. Such
relationship is ambiguous under the pure-assembly regime, and is absent in an assembly-intensive
sector.
Our model predicts that in a headquarter-intensive sector, rms operating under pure-assembly
are more productive than those under import-and-assembly. Moreover, only the most productive
rms nd it protable to integrate with their assembly plants under pure-assembly, which involves
the highest xed cost among the four production modes. Regarding di¤erences in heterogeneity
across sectors, our model therefore predicts that when the distribution of rm productivity becomes
more dispersed away from the lowest productivity in a sector (i.e., when  decreases), the share of
integrated plantsexports become more prevalent under pure-assembly, but not necessarily under
import-and-assembly. See appendix for a proof. The second hypothesis that we will test in this
paper is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Productivity Dispersion and the Prevalence of FDI Given the ranking
of xed costs of production as specied in (2), in a headquarter-intensive sector, a higher sectoral
productivity dispersion is associated with a larger export share of integrated plantsexports under
the pure-assembly regime. Such relationship is ambiguous under the import-and-assembly regime,
and is absent in an assembly-intensive sector.
4 Data
To examine the determinants of vertical integration in di¤erent trade regimes in China, we use
trade data from the Customs General Administration of the Peoples Republic of China.15 The
data report values in US dollars for imports and exports of over 7,000 products in the HS 6-digit
15We purchased these data from Mr. George Shen from China Customs Statistics Information Center, Economic
Information Agency, Hong Kong.
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classication (example of a product: 611241 - Womens or girlsswimwear of synthetic bres, knitted
or crocheted), from and to over 200 destinations around the world, by type of enterprise (out of 9
types, e.g. state owned, foreign invested, sino-foreign joint venture), region or city in China where
the product was exported from or imported to (out of around 700 locations), customs regime (out
of 18 regimes, e.g. "Processing and Assembling" and "Processing with Imported Materials").16
In this paper we use data for processing trade which is classied according to the special customs
regimes "Processing and Assembling" (pure-assembly) and "Processing with Imported Materials"
(import-and-assembly). Regular trade is classied by China Customs Statistics according to the
regime "Ordinary Trade".
Our key dependent variable is the share of vertical integration in total processing exports of
a HS 6-digit product in each trade regime (pure-assembly or import-and-assembly). Let p denote
product and j industry. V and O represent vertical integration and outsourcing, respectively. Our
dependent variable, X lVpj =(X
lV
pj + X
lO
pj ), is the value of processing exports in trade regime l from
foreign owned assembly plants as a share of total processing exports in the regime. The Chinese
government considers two types of foreign-invested enterprises, fully foreign-owned enterprises and
Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, in which according to the Chinese law a foreign partner has
no less than 25% of ownership stake. We consider both of these types of enterprises as "foreign
owned".
Our key independent variables are a number of measures of headquarter intensity. Following
the existing empirical literature on the determinants of intrarm trade, such as Antràs (2003),
Yeaple (2006), Bernard et al. (2008) and Nunn and Treer (2008a,b), we use skill and capital
intensities as our proxies for the importance of headquarter services in production. The measures
of industry factor intensity are constructed using data from the Bartelsman and Gray (1996) data
base, averaged across the period 2001-2005.17 Following Nunn and Treer (2008a,b), we use U.S.
factor intensities of production, assuming that they are correlated with the corresponding factor
intensities in other countries. For each 4-digit SIC industry we use information on total capi-
tal, capital-equipment, capital-structures (plant), wages of production workers and non-production
workers, and total expenditures on materials. Using this information we construct the measure
of skill-intensity, ln(Hj=Lj); as the log of non-production worker wages divided by total worker
wages. Capital intensity (total capital, ln(Kj=Lj), capital-equipment, ln(Ej=Lj), and capital-plant,
ln(Pj=Lj)) are measured as the natural log of the corresponding capital expenditures divided by
total wages. Material intensity, ln(Mj=Lj), is measured as the log of the cost of materials divided
by total workers wages. To check robustness of the results, we construct measures of capital and
skill intensity using Chinese plant-level data from the Census of Industrial Firms conducted by
the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics in 2004. Due to data limitation, the denitions of these
factor intensity measures are di¤erent from the US-based benchmark measures. Capital intensity
is dened as the log ratio of the real value of capital to the real value of output in each sector.
Human capital is the log of the share of high-school graduates in the workforce of each sector.
We also include R&D intensity to proxy for headquarters inputs. The data used to construct
R&D intensity are from the Orbis database, which has information for around 60 million companies
worldwide. The database is constructed by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. We measure
16The data also report quantity, quantity units, customs o¢ ces (ports) where the transaction was processed (97 in
total), and transportation modes.
17We are grateful to Randy Becker from the U.S. Bureau of the Census for providing us with an updated version
of the database.
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R&D intensity, ln(RDj=Qj), by the natural log of global R&D expenditures divided by rm sales
in each industry. The data are from the most recent year for which rm level data on R&D are
available (either 2006 or 2007). A total of 370 691 plants reported positive R&D expenditure in those
two years. To check robustness of our results, we also compute R&D and advertisement intensities
using data from the Chinese National Bureau of Statisticss Survey of Industrial Firms for 2005.
R&D intensity is measured by the log average ratio of R&D expenditure to value-added across
rms in each sector. Advertisement intensity is measured by the log average ratio of advertisement
expenditure to value-added across rms in each sector.
To capture the contractibility of inputs, we use the sectoral measures from Nunn (2007), which
equal the proportion of an industrys intermediate inputs that are relationship-specic and therefore
more susceptible to contracting problems. Because we want a measure that is increasing in the
completeness of contracts, we use one minus the fraction of inputs not sold on exchanges and not
reference-priced. The measures are constructed using information from 1997 US I-O table and
Rauch (1999) classication of di¤erentiated and homogeneous products.
We also use the measure of industry productivity dispersion from Nunn and Treer (2008a) for
2005. The construction of this measure follows Helpman et al. (2004).18 We use the US productivity
dispersion measure, assuming that decisions on the organizational form of the production unit are
usually made by headquarters in developed countries. We believe that the US-based measure is a
good proxy for productivity dispersion in other developed countries. To check robustness of the
results regarding productivity dispersion, we compute the standard deviation of export revenue
across Chinese export processing plants in each sector, using rm-level exports data for 2005 from
Chinas Customs.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we use detailed product-level export data for China in 2005 to examine the prevalence
of FDI versus outsourcing across industries in the two trade regimes of export processing.
5.1 Examining the E¤ects of Headquarter Intensity
To test Hypothesis 1, we start by estimating the following cross-industry regression at the HS
6-digit product level, for each trade regime separately:
X lVpj
X lVpj +X
lO
pj
= + H ln

Hj
Lj

+ K ln

Kj
Lj

+ M ln

Mj
Lj

+ pj , (6)
where p stands for product, j stands for industry, and V and O represent vertical integration and
outsourcing, respectively. The dependent variable is the share of Chinese exports of a HS 6-digit
product in industry j under trade regime l that are from foreign a¢ liates. To proxy for head-
quarter intensity, we use the measures of skill-intensity ln(Hj=Lj) and capital-intensity ln(Kj=Lj)
18Using rm sales as a measure of rm productivity, they construct estimates of the dispersion of rm productivity
using standard deviation of rm sales across all rms within an industry. Given the lack of rm-level data, Nunn and
Treer (2008a) construct sales of "notional" rms using U.S. export data from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
They dene an industry as an HS6 product and the sales of a notional rm as the exports of an HS10 good exported
from U.S. location l to destination country c. Their measure of productivity dispersion within an industry is the
standard deviation of the log of exports of a good from location l to country c. We are grateful to Nathan Nunn for
sending us the data for the measure of productivity dispersion of US rms.
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described in the previous section.19 Since we are interested in studying the decisions of integration
by multinational rms in the two trade regimes under which the control rights of components are
allocated to di¤erent parties, we use material intensity ln(Mj=Lj) as a proxy for the importance of
components in production.  is a constant and the error term j is assumed to be uncorrelated with
the regressors. To check robustness, we use R&D intensity ln(RDj=Qj) as an alternative measure
of headquarter intensity.20
Hypothesis 1 says that exports from vertically integrated plants account for a larger share
of exports in more headquarter-intensive sectors under the import-and-assembly regime, but not
necessarily under pure-assembly. Thus, the predicted signs of H and K are positive for the
import-and-assembly sample.
Estimates of equation (6) for both trade regimes are shown in Table 3. We regress the share of
integrated plantsexports in total exports on a number of measures of headquarter intensities. An
industry is dened as a SIC-87 4-digit category. Mapping of HS 6-digit categories to SIC 4-digit
industries is discussed in detail in the appendix. Because our regressors of interest only vary across
SIC 4-digit industries, the standard errors are clustered at the SIC 4-digit level to take into account
the correlation between observations (HS 6-digit level) within the same SIC category. In columns
(1) through (4), we report results for the import-and-assembly regime. The standardized beta
coe¢ cients on skill intensity are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The impact is
also economically meaningful. These coe¢ cients suggest that a one standard-deviation increase in
skill intensity is associated with between 0.121 and 0.137 standard-deviation increases in the share
of integrated plantsexports, which correspond to 2 to 3 percentage-point increases. These results
conrm the main ndings by Bernard et al. (2008), Nunn and Treer (2008a,b) and Yeaple (2006),
who nd a positive relationship between skill intensity and the share of intrarm trade across U.S.
manufacturing industries. The size of the coe¢ cients is at the same magnitude of those reported
by Nunn and Treer (2008a) for the U.S.
For import-and-assembly exports, the coe¢ cients on capital intensity are negative and statisti-
cally signicant, in contrast with the theoretical predictions of existing theories. Similar to a recent
study by Nunn and Treer (2008b), we explore the varying degree of relationship specicity of
di¤erent kinds of physical capital. In Antràs (2003), it is assumed that investments by either party
of a trade relationship are completely relationship-specic. If the two parties disagree to continue
the relationship, the value of the inputs outside the relationship is 0. However, if capital is partially
relationship-specic, its value outside the relationship is positive, and is decreasing with the speci-
city of the capital. Nunn and Treer (2008b) argue that equipment and machinery tend to be
more relationship-specic, while buildings and plants can be resold and reused for the production
of other goods and thus are associated with a higher outside value. Based on this argument, we
should expect to nd di¤erent results for di¤erent types of capital. To this end, instead of adding
an overall measure of capital intensity, we include equipment-capital (more relationship-specic)
intensity, ln(Ej=Lj), and plant-capital (less relationship-specic) intensity, ln(Pj=Lj) separately in
the regressions. In column (3), we nd that only the coe¢ cient on plant intensity is negative and
statistically signicant. The coe¢ cient on equipment intensity, on the other hand, is positive but
statistically insignicant.
19We also use total employment of each sector as the denominator of each measure of factory intensity instead of
total worker wages. Our results are insensitive to the use of these alternative measures.
20Although conceptually R&D intensity is potentially a better measure, there are issues related with data availability
and quality and therefore we use it for robustness checks.
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Columns (2) and (4) report results when we include R&D intensity as an alternative measure
of headquarter inputs. R&D intensity and skill intensity are highly correlated and therefore are
not included as regressors simultaneously. Column (2) shows that the coe¢ cient on R&D intensity
is positive and statistically signicant at the 10% level, and suggests that a one standard-deviation
increase in R&D intensity is associated with a 0.069 standard-deviation increase in the share of
integrated plantsexports. The coe¢ cient on R&D intensity is no longer statistically signicant
when we include equipment-capital and plant-capital intensities separately in column (4).
Results for pure-assembly are reported in columns (5) to (8). We nd in general no statistically
signicant relationships between the measures of headquarter intensity and the share of integrated
plantsexports across sectors, with the exceptions of R&D intensity for which we nd negative and
statistically signicant coe¢ cients at the 5% level (columns (6) and (8)). These results are consistent
with our theoretical prediction that the relationship between the prevalence of integrated plants
exports and headquarter intensity is ambiguous for pure-assembly exports. With rm heterogeneity,
the export shares of rms from the outsourcing and vertical integration modes under pure-assembly
both increase when headquarter intensity rises. The share of integrated plantsexports under pure-
assembly, thus, can rise or fall.
Since we are using export shares aggregated across di¤erent importing countries within the same
product, the above results may mask substantial di¤erences in importing country characteristics,
as well as di¤erences in the relationship between China and these countries, such as di¤erences
in distance, institutional and factor endowments. To this end, we repeat the analysis by using
unilateral export value in a HS 6-digit product category to each importing country as the unit of
observation. Since our focus is on the sectoral determinants of the export share of integrated plants,
we control for country xed e¤ects to parse out the e¤ects of unobserved countriescharacteristics.
We therefore estimate the following regression:
X lVpjc
X lVpjc +X
lO
pjc
= dc + H ln

Hj
Lj

+ K ln

Kj
Lj

+ M ln

Mj
Lj

+ pjc, (7)
where c stands for importing country and dc is a set of country xed e¤ects. The dependent variable
is the share of Chinese exports of a HS 6-digit product (p) to country c under trade regime l that are
from foreign a¢ liates. Table 4 reports the results. For the import-and-assembly regime (columns
(1) to (4)), we nd a positive and signicant relationship between the share of integrated plants
exports and all measures of intensity of headquarter inputs (skill, R&D and capital-equipment).
The coe¢ cients suggest that a one standard-deviation increase in skill intensity is associated with
between 0.168 and 0.191 standard-deviation increases in the share of integrated plants exports,
while a one standard-deviation increase in R&D intensity is associated with about a 0.1 standard-
deviation increase in the share of integrated plantsexports. These coe¢ cients are all statistically
signicant at the 1% level. We again obtain negative coe¢ cients on capital intensity, but in column
(3), we obtain a positive and statistical signicant coe¢ cient on the intensity of equipment, the
more relationship-specic type of capital, and a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient
on plant intensity, the type of capital that is less relationship-specic. These results support the
theoretical prediction that a higher intensity of headquarter inputs, particularly those that are more
relationship-specic, increases the export share of integrated plants under import-and-assembly.
A higher material intensity is found to have a negative impact on the integrated plantsexport
share (signicant at the 5% level in column (3)). Although our theoretical model does not formally
discuss the relationship between material intensity and the propensity to vertically integrate, we can
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still use insights from the property-rights approach to explain the relationship. Under import-and-
assembly, the control rights over materials are allocated to the assembly plant. Since integration
e¤ectively grants a bigger share of expected revenue to the headquarter, it weakens the plants
incentive to invest in input-search activities. The distortion e¤ects are bigger in more material-
intensive sectors, making integration a less preferred organization mode.
For pure-assembly (columns (5) to (8)), we nd negative and signicant coe¢ cients on skill
intensity and on R&D intensity. While these results should not be taken as a rejection of existing
theories on intrarm trade, they are consistent with our theoretical prediction that the mass of
rms switching from import-and-assembly to pure-assembly outsourcing can be larger than that
switching to integration under pure-assembly. In other words, ownership of imported materials
can serve as a relatively less costly way to alleviate the hold-up problem by the assembly plant,
compared with integration.
So far, we have examined exports from China to the rest of the world, regardless of whether
the importing countries are developed or not. To obtain a set of empirical results mapping the pre-
dictions of a North-South trade model, we should focus on Chinese exports to developed countries.
To this end, we conduct regression analyses over samples of low-income countries, high-income
countries, and a few selected countries. The results are reported in Table 5. For the import-and-
assembly regime, we nd positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on skill intensity across
all country samples. If we restrict exports to low-income countries (column (1)), the magnitude of
the coe¢ cient (0.222) is bigger than that for high-income countries (0.125). To address the concern
that the US-based factor intensity measures do not reect the intrinsic properties of production,
and are specic only to the U.S., we focus on exports only to the U.S. in column (3). The results
are similar to those in Table 4. In particular, we nd a signicantly positive relationship between
capital-equipment intensity and the share of integrated plantsexports.
Columns (4) and (5) report consistent results using the samples of exports to Japan and high-
income European countries, respectively. In column (6) we exclude exports to Hong Kong from
the sample to address the concern that some foreign-owned plants may have their headquarters in
Hong Kong, who serve as intermediaries to re-export nal products to foreign clients. The results
are very similar to those when the full sample of countries is used. The lower part of the table
reports results for the pure-assembly regime. The results for di¤erent country groups are consistent
with those when the full sample is used in column (7) of Table 4. In short, empirical results for
Hypothesis 1 are robust to the use of di¤erent country samples.
The factor intensity measures we used so far are constructed using data from U.S. manufacturing
rms, based on the assumption that the ranking of these measures is stable across countries.
Although this approach has been widely adopted in previous empirical studies,21 we use factor
intensity and R&D intensity measures constructed using Chinese rm-level data, as described in
the previous section, to check the robustness of our results. Table 6 reports the regression results
using these Chinese-plant-based factor intensity measures. We obtain a positive and signicant
relationship between skill intensity, R&D and advertisement intensity, and the share of integrated
plantsexports under import-and-assembly. The coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% level and of
similar magnitude for both measures of headquarters inputs. The results are independent of using
21The approach of using sector measures constructed using U.S. data originates from Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Subsequent empirical studies on countries comparative advantage have adopted the same approach. See Romalis
(2003), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Manova (2007), among others.
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samples at the country-product level. For pure-assembly exports, the sign of the coe¢ cient on skill
intensity turns negative, and those on capital intensity and R&D intensity become insignicant.
These results are largely consistent with the results obtained when we use US-based measures of
factor intensity.
5.2 Examining the E¤ects of Productivity Dispersion
This section investigates the e¤ects of rm productivity dispersion, and its interactive e¤ects with
headquarter intensity, on the prevalence of integrated plantsexports across industries. It is now
a well-known fact that rm productivity di¤ers widely within an industry, and exhibits a at-tail
distribution. According to Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2009), the top 1 (10) percent
of the U.S. trading rms accounted for 81 (96) percent of U.S. trade in 2000.
Helpman et. al (2004) show that a conceptually valid measure of productivity dispersion is
the standard deviation of the log of rm sales across rms within an industry. We use the stan-
dard deviation of (log) sales across all rms within an industry in the U.S.

j

as the empirical
counterpart of productivity dispersion, and estimate the following equation to examine Hypothesis
2:
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where p, j and c stand for product, industry and country respectively. ln (Ej=Lj) and ln (Pj=Lj)
are the measures of equipment-capital and plant-capital intensity and j is a measure of one of
the intensity proxies for headquarter inputs: skill or equipment-capital. We control for importer
heterogeneity by including country xed e¤ects, dc. Hypothesis 2 states that the more productive
headquarters choose to integrate with assembly plants in headquarter-intensive sectors, but not in
assembly-intensive sectors. Moreover, the model predicts that the most productive rms choose
pure-assembly integration in headquarter-intensive sectors. Thus, we expect  > 0 and  > 0
for the pure-assembly regime.
Using the product-country sample, we report the estimates of equation (8) in Table 7. We
include all stand-alone headquarter intensity measures as controls, and cluster standard errors at
the SIC 4-digit level. Columns (1) and (2) report results for the import-and-assembly regime,
while columns (3) and (4) report those for pure-assembly. For import-and-assembly, we do not nd
evidence supporting a positive relationship between sectoral productivity dispersion and the share
of integrated plantsexports. While the coe¢ cient on the stand-alone dispersion term is positive
and statistically signicant when equipment-capital intensity is used for j , the coe¢ cient on the
interaction term is negative and statistically signicant in column (2). When skill intensity is used
as a measure of headquarter intensity, the coe¢ cients are no longer signicant.
For pure-assembly, when skill intensity is interacted with j , the estimated coe¢ cients on both
the dispersion and the interaction terms are positive and statistically signicant. When we use
equipment-capital intensity to proxy for j , we continue to nd a strongly positive coe¢ cient on
the interaction term. When we restrict the sample to consider only exports to the US, the results
reported in columns (7) and (8) show that all coe¢ cients on both the dispersion and the interaction
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term are positive and statistically signicant (at the 1% level). In sum, we nd that the export
share of integrated plants increases in productivity dispersion in sectors with higher headquarter
intensity under pure-assembly, supporting Hypothesis 2.
The empirical specication above imposes a linear restriction on the relationship between pro-
ductivity dispersion and the prevalence of integration. To examine the theoretical prediction in
a more exible framework, and to identify the cut-o¤ level of headquarter intensity over which
productivity dispersion matters, we follow Nunn and Treer (2008) and consider a regression that
allows the relationship between rm heterogeneity and integrated plantsexports to di¤er by quin-
tiles of headquarter intensity. We rank our SIC-1987 4-digit industries by headquarter intensity
measured either by skill or by capital-equipment. Then we divide the industries into 5 quintiles of
headquarter intensity. We dene headquarter intensity quintile dummies as Ijq = 1 if industry j is
in quintile q, q = 1 being the least headquarters-intensive quintile. We estimate equation (9) below
which includes interaction terms between the quintile dummies and the productivity dispersion
measure. The equation includes country xed e¤ects, headquarter intensity quintile dummies and
headquarter intensity controls. The standard errors are clustered at the SIC 4-digit level. The
coe¢ cients of interest are qs.
X lVpjc
X lVpjc +X
lO
pjc
= dc + H ln

Hj
Lj

+ E ln

Ej
Lj

+ P ln

Pj
Lj

+ M ln

Mj
Lj

(9)
+
5X
q=1
qI

jq +
5X
q=1
q(

j  Ijq) + pjc,
where p, j and c stand for product, industry and country respectively.
The results are reported in Table 8. Columns (1) through (4) report results for the import-
and-assembly regime, while columns (5) through (8) report those for pure-assembly. The average
e¤ect across all industries is positive and statistically signicant for the pure-assembly regime and
is estimated at 0.09 or 0.07 depending on whether we include quintile dummies or not (columns
(5) and (6)). This suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in productivity dispersion is
associated with an increase in the export share of integrated plants of about 2 percentage points.
The coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant for the import-and-assembly sample (columns (1) and
(2)).
Next, we let the e¤ect of productivity dispersion vary depending on the headquarter intensity
of the industry. Results for pure-assembly (columns (7) and (8)) show a jump in the magnitude of
the positive relationship at around the 4th quintile. The coe¢ cients on the interaction between the
quantile dummies and the productivity dispersion measure become positive and statistically signif-
icant after the 4th quintile for measures of skill and capital-equipment intensities. There appears to
be a cut-o¤ level of headquarter intensity above which productivity dispersion increases the share
of integrated rms exports; for industries below this cut-o¤, there is no signicant relationship.
Regarding exports under import-and-assembly, we nd no signicant relationship between produc-
tivity dispersion and the export share of integrated plants, as suggested by the model (see columns
(3) and (4)).
As further robustness checks, we also use a Chinese-based measure of productivity dispersion.
Our measure of productivity dispersion is the standard deviation of the log of export revenue of
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export processing plants in each sector in 2005. The results using these measures are reported in
Table 9. Under import-and-assembly (columns (1) and (2)), the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms
are insignicant, while under pure-assembly, we continue to obtain positive and signicant coe¢ -
cients on the interaction terms, supporting the results using the US-based productivity dispersion
measures and Hypothesis 2.
5.3 Examining the E¤ects of the Contractibility of SuppliersInputs
Antràs and Helpman (2008) relax the assumption that relationship-specic investments are com-
pletely non-contractible, and allow for varying degrees of contractibility across inputs and countries.
An important prediction is that the degree of which the investments are contractible are important
determinants of vertical integration by multinationals. Holding headquarter intensity constant, an
increased contractibility of the suppliers inputs, possibly due to an improvement in the legal or
property-rights institutions of the suppliers country, can have surprising e¤ects on the propensity
to integrate. Therefore, in this section, we investigate the following hypothesis:
Given the ranking of xed costs of production as specied in (2), consider an improvement
in the contractibility of the assembly plants inputs. On the one hand, the improvement in the
contractibility of inputs implies more tasks being contractible (Standard E¤ect"). Thus, the
motives for integration to reduce the hold-up e¤ects are lessened. On the other hand, because more
tasks are contractible, the headquarter is less concerned about the distortion e¤ects of integration
on the suppliers investment incentives (Surprise E¤ect"). As such, integration becomes preferred
even in sectors with a lower headquarter intensity.
Hypothesis 3: Contractibility of Investments and FDI (1) In headquarter-intensive sec-
tors, if the "Standard E¤ect" dominates, the export share of integrated plantsexports decreases
in the contractibility of inputs under import-and-assembly.
(2) If the "Surprise E¤ect" dominates, the export share of integrated plantsexports increases
in the contractibility of inputs under import-and-assembly.
(3) The relationship is ambiguous for pure-assembly, and is absent in assembly-intensive sectors.
To examine Hypothesis 3, we estimate the following equation:
X lVpjc
X lVpjc +X
lO
pjc
= dc + H ln

Hj
Lj

+ E ln

Ej
Lj

+ P ln

Pj
Lj

+ M ln

Mj
Lj

(10)
+ZZj + ZZjj + pjc,
where p, j and c stand for product, industry and country respectively. Zj stands for the contractibil-
ity of the assembly plants inputs.22 A higher Zj represents a higher degree of contractibility. We
adopt the measure of contractibility from Nunn (2007), which equals one minus the share of inter-
mediate inputs for production in a sector that are not sold on an exchange or reference-priced. j
is a measure of one of the factor intensities. Hypothesis 3 predicts that Z and Z can be posi-
tive or negative for the import-and-assembly regime, depending on whether the "Standard E¤ect"
dominates the "Surprise E¤ect" or vice versa.
22Specically, Nunn (2007) uses the input-output table for the U.S. industries to gauge the extent of the overall
market thickness of the upstream sectors of an industry.
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Table 10 reports estimates of equation (10) for a sample of unilateral exports to each country and
for a sample of exports to the US only, both at the HS 6-digit level. Headquarter intensity measures
are always controlled for. For pure-assembly exports, we nd no signicant relationship between
contract completeness and the prevalence of integration. This is expected for the same reason that
headquarter intensity has an indeterminate impact on the prevalence of integration in this regime.
For import-and-assembly exports, when capital-equipment intensity is used to measure headquarter
inputs, we nd negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the interaction term between
input contractibility and headquarter intensity. Thus, an increased contractibility of the suppliers
inputs is found to reduce the export share of integrated plants in the more headquarter-intensive
sectors. This result suggests the dominance of the "Standard E¤ect". The results obtained are the
same whether we consider the full sample or the sample of exports to the US only.
To identify the cut-o¤ level of headquarter intensity over which contract completeness of inputs
a¤ects the propensity to integrate, we follow Nunn and Treer (2008a) and consider a regression
that allows the relationship between the contractibility of suppliersinputs and integrated plants
exports to di¤er by quintiles of headquarter intensity. Similar to our investigation of the non-
linear relationship for productivity dispersion above, we rst rank our SIC-1987 industries by
headquarter intensity. Then we divide the industries into 5 quintiles of headquarter intensity.
We estimate equation (11) below which includes interaction terms between the quintile dummies
and the contractibility measure. Country xed e¤ects, headquarter intensity quintile dummies and
headquarter intensity controls are included. The standard errors are clustered at the SIC 4-digit
level. The coe¢ cients of interest are the Zqs.
X lVpjc
X lVpjc +X
lO
pjc
= dc + H ln

Hj
Lj

+ E ln

Ej
Lj

+ P ln

Pj
Lj

+ M ln

Mj
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
(11)
+
5X
q=1
qI

jq +
5X
q=1
Zq(Zj  Ijq) + pjc,
where p, j and c stand for product, industry and country respectively.
The results are reported in Table 11. For import-and-assembly (columns (1) and (2)), we nd
a negative impact on integrated exports from the interaction between input contractibility and
headquarter intensity for the top 40% of headquarter-intensive sectors, when equipment-capital
intensity is used as proxy for headquarter intensity. For pure-assembly (columns (3) and (4)), no
signicant relationship is found. These results conrm the nding reported above that an increased
contractibility of the suppliers inputs reduces the export share of integrated plants in the more
headquarter-intensive sectors under import-and-assembly.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses detailed product-level export data for China to investigate the determinants of
integration versus outsourcing. We exploit the coexistence of two regulatory trade regimes for
export processing in China, pure-assembly and import-and-assembly, which let us observe the
allocation of ownership and control rights over imported inputs between a foreign client and a
domestic plant. Under import-and-assembly, Chinese plants have control rights and ownership
over the imported materials. Under pure-assembly, ownership over the materials shipped to China
22
remains with the foreign rm. To examine how choices of organizational structure are a¤ected by the
consideration of allocation arrangements of control rights and ownership over components in export
processing, we present an extension of the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model to consider component
search for assembling. By considering two ownership structures under two trade regimes, our model
predicts that headquarter intensity and the prevalence of integration are positively correlated under
import-and-assembly. The relationship is ambiguous under pure-assembly.
Our empirical results show that when Chinese assembly plants import materials from abroad,
the export share of integrated plants is increasing in the intensity of headquarter inputs across
sectors, and is decreasing in the contractibility of inputs. These results are consistent with existing
theories. However, if Chinese plants engage in pure-assembly (i.e., the foreign rm has ownership
over the materials shipped to China), we nd no relationship between the prevalence of vertical in-
tegration and the intensity of headquarter inputs or the degree of contract incompleteness of inputs.
These results are consistent with the model, and are relevant for the situation when ownership of
imported components, in addition to asset ownership, can be used to alleviate the hold-up problem
by the export-processing plant.
Consistent with the sorting of rms into di¤erent production modes based on productivity, we
nd that an increased productivity dispersion is associated with a bigger export share of integrated
plants under pure-assembly, but not under import-and-assembly. In particular, in sectors with
higher headquarter intensity, the share of integrated plantsexports increases with rm productivity
dispersion. Our results complement existing ndings based on the headquarters side of the story
in developed countries, and validate the predictions of the theoretical literature on incomplete
contracting, organizational structure and international trade.
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A Appendix
Deriving Firm Prots under Pure-Assembly Under pure-assembly, H invests in both com-
ponent search and headquarter services. The cost of component search is N , while wages in the
North and South are wN and wS , respectively. Since investments are not contractible ex ante,
anticipating ex post bargaining, H maximizes her expected operating prots as:
max
m;h
NkR (m;a; h)  Nm  wNh;
Under pure-assembly, As maximization problem is
max
a
(1  Nk)R (m;a; h)  wSa.
For a given organizational form k 2 fV;Og, solving the rst order conditions of the headquarters
problem and the assembly plants problem simultaneously gives the prot-maximization investment
levels a, h and m in terms of wS , wN , , , D, s and importantly, Nk. 23.
Plugging the privately optimal investment levels into the joint prot function, we obtain rm
operating prot as Nk = D Nk   wNNk, where   

1  , Nk is the xed cost associated
with organization mode k under pure-assembly, and
 Nk =
1   Nkh + Nkm + (1  Nk) a
1



Nk
m 
wS
1 Nk
a 
wN
Nk
h 1  .
The function  Nk reaches its maximum when
d Nk
dNk
= 0. Solving this equation yields
N

h

=
 !  h  1  !  h+pa (1  ! (h)) (1  ! (h)) (1   (1  ! (h)))
2! (h)  1 ;
where !
 
h

= 1   m   h. Notice 0N
 
h

> 0, which is an essential property for determining
the ex-ante optimal choice of production mode.
Deriving Firm Prots under Import-and-Assembly Under import-and-assembly, H invests
only in headquarter activities. The cost of component search is S , while wages in the North and
South are wN and wS , respectively. Since investments are not contractible ex ante, anticipating ex
post bargaining, H maximizes her expected operating prots as:
max
h
SkR (m; a; h)  wNh
As maximization problem is
max
a;m
(1  Sk)R (m;a; h)  Sm  wSa
23m = m
"
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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1 
# 1
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Nk
"
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1 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a wSawNhm
NkD
1 
# 1
 1
;wNh =
h
"
Nk
1 Nk
a wSawNhm
NkD
1 
# 1
 1
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For a given organizational form k 2 fV;Og, solving the rst order conditions of the headquarters
problem and the assembly plants problem simultaneously gives the prot-maximization investment
levels a, h and m in terms of wS , wN , , , D, s and importantly, Sk. 24.
Plugging the privately optimal investment levels into the joint prot function, we obtain rm
operating prot as Sk =  Sk
 
Sk; 
m; h

D  wNSk, where   

1  and
 Sk

Sk; 
a; h

=
1   Skh + (1  Sk)  1  h
1



1 Sk
m 
wS
1 Sk
a 
wN
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h 1  .
The function  Sk reaches its maximum when
d Sk
dSk
= 0, which implies
S

h

=
 h  1    1  h+ph (1  h) (1  h) (1   (1  h))
2 (1  h)  1
Notice that 0S
 
h

> 0, which is an essential property for determining the ex ante optimal
choice of production mode.
The Analysis on the Conditions for  Nk >  Sk To examine when  Nk >  Sk for a given
organization mode k; let us focus on a constant component intensity m for simplicity.  Nk >  Sk
if the following inequality holds:25 
N
S
m
 '
 
Nk; 
h

 (Sk; 
h)
, (12)
where '
 
; h

=

1    h + m + (1  )  1  h   m 1  h+m (1  )1 h m and   ; h =
1    h + (1  )  1  h 1  (1  )1 h h . This inequality is more likely to hold if the
nal-good producer commands a bigger cost advantage over component search (i.e., N=S is
smaller).26 Otherwise, if S < N , Hs bargaining power associated with outsourcing under pure-
assembly needs to be signicantly bigger than that under import-assembly (i.e., NO >> SO) for
(12) to hold. For instance, if control rights over components greatly enhance As outside option
(i.e., high ), NO can be much bigger than SO. Importantly, in su¢ ciently headquarter-intensive
sectors (i.e., h is su¢ ciently large), both ' and  are increasing in  and ' >  except when  is
very small.
Deriving Expressions of the Market Share of Integrated Firms Under Each Trade
Regime Recall that for a headquarter-intensive sector, total export value when all four production
24m = m
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
# 1
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.
25We obtain this inequality by rearranging  Nk
 
Nk; 
a; h

>  Sk
 
Sk; 
a; h

for a given organizational mode
k.
26Notice that both ' and  are non-monotonic in  for low value of h. In particular, in an assembly-intensive
sector (i.e., when h is small),  cuts ' from above at  > 1=2, after which both  and ' are decreasing in .
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modes exist is
X = D
Z 1
SO
R () dG ()
= D [ SOV (SO;SV ) +  SV V (SV ;NO) +  NOV (NO;NV ) +  NV V (NV ;1)]
where
V (A;B) =
Z B
A
dG () =  
 
A1   B1 
where   = 

min
 1 .
The productivity cuto¤s (production mode margins) can be solved using a set of indi¤erence
conditions (e.g. SV
 
NO; D; 
a; h

= NO
 
NO; D; 
a; h

) as
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B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 SO
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where B = wN=D.
Export value of each production mode can be expressed in terms of the productivity cuto¤s as:
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 
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We can express the market share of integrated plants exports under import-and-assembly as
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The market share of integrated plants exports under pure-assembly is
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XNV +XNO
=

1 +
XNO
XNV
 1
=
"
1 +
 NO
 NV
 
NO
NV
1 
  1
!# 1
.
29
Proof of Hypothesis 1 The market share of integrated plants exports under import-and-
assembly is given in (4). In su¢ ciently headquarter-intensive sectors, all four production modes
exist and  
lV =
 
lO
> 1 and is increasing in h for l 2 fN;Sg (see Antràs, 2003). Similarly, with
the assumption that NO > SV ,  NO= SV > 1 and is increasing in 
h for l 2 fN;Sg. It follows
that d
dh

NO
SO

> 0, d
dh

NO
SV

7 0, d
dh

SV
SO

< 0, d
dh

NV
NO

7 0. Using these comparative
statics, it is straightforward to show that XSVXSV +XSO in (4) is increasing in 
h.
The market share of integrated plants exports under pure-assembly is given in (5). Since the sign
of d
dh

NV
NO

is ambiguous, the market share of integrated assembly plants under pure-assembly
is ambiguous. To understand what factors may drive the export share of integrated plants to
increase, consider d
dh

NO
NV

, that is the key determinant of the sign of the relationship between
this share and headquarter intensity across sectors. We nd that sgn

d
dh
NO
NV

is positive if ddh ( NV = NO)d
dh
( SV = NO)
 >  NV = NO 11  SV = NO , and negative otherwise. This inequality is more likely to hold if the
e¢ ciency gains (due to changes in the incentives to invest) by obtaining ownership of the plants
asset is greater than the loss of giving up control rights over imported materials.
Proof of Hypothesis 2 Let us denote the variance of  by V = 2min (  1) 2 (  2) 1. It
can be shown that dVd < 0.
Using (4), and that SV =SO > 1 and NO=SO > 1, the sign of dd

XSV
XSV +XSO

is indeter-
minate.
Using (5), and that NV =NO > 1, it can be shown that dd

XNV
XNV +XNO

< 0 (i.e., XNVXNV +XNO
is increasing with the variance of ).
Data Appendix The concordance le for mapping SIC87 (4-digit) codes to HS-6 digit codes is
taken from Peter Schotts website. We use the new concordance of 1989-2008 US HS codes to US
SIC, SITC and NAICS codes over time, based on exports.27 When more than one SIC code is
identied for a HS6 code (it happens for 371 HS6 codes out of 5203 in manufacturing industries),
the SIC code that covers the most HS8 categories within the HS6 code is used. For some cases,
a HS6 code has multiple SIC codes tied in the number of HS8 categories shared (it happens for
208 cases). In those situations, we choose the SIC category that has the highest number of HS6
categories under it as the unique map.
27http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm
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Table 1: Export Shares Across Trade Regimes (2005)
Total processing Pure-assembly Import-and-assembly
US $1 billion 416.48 83.97 332.51
Share of total exports 54.70% 11.00% 43.60%
Share of exports by FOE 80.60% 50.00% 88.30%
Source: Chinese export data from the Customs General Administration of the Peoples Republic of China
Table 2: Export Shares of the 4 Ownership x Trade Production Modes (2005)
Organizational Forms
Integration (V) Outsourcing (O)
Component Search Pure-assembly (N) 9.67% 12.22% 21.89%
Import-and-assembly (S) 59.71% 18.40% 78.11%
69.38% 30.62%
Source: Chinese export data from the Customs General Administration of the Peoples Republic of China
Table 3: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (HS6 level)
Trade Regime: Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.121*** 0.137*** -0.066 -0.081*
(2.998) (3.238) (-1.533) (-1.892)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) -0.104** -0.142*** -0.026 0.002
(-2.237) (-3.719) (-0.804) (0.064)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.069* 0.060 -0.070** -0.069**
(1.954) (1.636) (-2.169) (-2.075)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.085* -0.073 0.024 0.002
(-1.721) (-1.433) (0.585) (0.055)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.068 -0.004 -0.117* -0.046
(1.108) (-0.065) (-1.961) (-0.727)
Plant Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.123** -0.100* 0.072 0.048
(-2.470) (-1.908) (1.114) (0.706)
N 3496 3376 3496 3376 2769 2660 2769 2660
No. clusters 348 317 348 317 331 300 331 300
R2 .032 .024 .041 .029 .004 .005 .008 .006
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (HS6-Country
level)
Trade Regime: Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.168*** 0.191*** -0.090** -0.119***
(4.914) (5.310) (-2.390) (-3.367)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) -0.086** -0.138*** 0.031 0.071
(-2.048) (-3.902) (0.736) (1.613)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.101*** 0.096*** -0.095*** -0.088***
(2.907) (2.656) (-2.825) (-2.665)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.093** -0.076 -0.009 -0.020
(-2.357) (-1.588) (-0.204) (-0.463)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.081** -0.030 -0.116** -0.038
(1.989) (-0.657) (-2.340) (-0.648)
Plant Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.118*** -0.071* 0.161*** 0.129***
(-3.076) (-1.726) (3.546) (2.605)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 72429 69669 72429 69669 34877 32883 34877 32883
No. clusters 348 317 348 317 331 300 331 300
R2 .065 .051 .076 .055 .081 .084 .095 .090
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on
standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Di¤erent
Country Groups) (HS6 level)
Import-and-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Group: LIC HIC US Japan Europe HIC Exclude HK
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.222*** 0.125*** 0.144*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.157***
(5.480) (2.941) (3.547) (4.419) (3.184) (3.267)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.099* -0.086* -0.109** -0.079* -0.085* -0.085
(-1.936) (-1.750) (-2.247) (-1.755) (-1.687) (-1.593)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.185** 0.056 0.115** 0.140*** 0.067 0.103*
(2.448) (0.929) (2.055) (2.877) (1.098) (1.726)
Plant Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.174*** -0.112** -0.156*** -0.182*** -0.147*** -0.163***
(-2.652) (-2.298) (-3.135) (-4.382) (-2.823) (-3.084)
N 1368 3412 2314 2494 2413 3362
No. Clusters 273 344 315 326 318 346
No. Countries 47 59 1 1 38 233
R2 .059 .037 .047 .047 .052 .050
Pure-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Group: LIC HIC US Japan Europe HIC Exclude HK
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) -0.085 -0.083* -0.099** -0.175*** -0.122*** -0.117***
(-1.328) (-1.891) (-2.313) (-4.620) (-2.781) (-2.997)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.031 0.030 0.036 0.048 0.029 0.023
(-0.419) (0.696) (0.693) (1.155) (0.519) (0.536)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.210** -0.139** -0.182*** -0.160** -0.086 -0.074
(2.418) (-2.339) (-3.110) (-2.574) (-1.407) (-1.300)
Plant Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.001 0.079 0.175*** 0.087 0.147* 0.063
(-0.008) (1.223) (2.689) (1.441) (1.864) (1.001)
N 548 2708 1599 1755 1536 2495
No. Clusters 181 330 289 290 277 323
No. Countries 47 59 1 1 38 233
R2 .058 .010 .025 .033 .026 .014
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports. Country classication by the World
Bank according to GNI per capita in 2007. LIC stands for Low income countries. HIC stands for High income countries. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country group. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based
on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Using Chinese
data to measure factor intensities)
Trade Regime Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
Observation unit HS6 Level HS6-Country Level HS6 Level HS6-Country Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity 0.088** 0.106*** -0.096*** -0.101**
(2.359) (3.385) (-2.639) (-2.251)
Capital Intensity -0.184*** -0.132*** -0.142*** -0.083** 0.013 -0.045 -0.017 -0.080*
(-5.198) (-3.907) (-3.697) (-2.151) (0.315) (-1.217) (-0.293) (-1.708)
RD+Advert intensity 0.112*** 0.102*** -0.057 -0.079*
(3.517) (3.628) (-1.538) (-1.771)
Country FE no no yes yes no no yes yes
N 3504 3111 72478 63733 2773 2467 34893 31282
No. Clusters 350 314 350 314 333 300 333 300
R2 .029 .031 .047 .043 0.008 0.005 .082 .083
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category. Skill intensity is measured by the average share of high-school workers in the
labor force of each sector, averaged across rms. Capital intensity is measured by the average ratio of real value of capital to
real output across rms. RD+Advert intensity is measured by the log ratio of the sum of R & D and advertisement
expenditure to value-added. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the
SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 7: Productivity Dispersion and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (US-export-
based dispersion measure) (HS6-Country level)
Exports to Each Country Exports to the USA
Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill equipment skill equipment skill equipment skill equipment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dispersion 0.050 0.071*** 0.270*** 0.033 0.029 0.081*** 0.471*** 0.067**
(0.921) (3.049) (2.946) (1.367) (0.435) (2.717) (3.929) (2.060)
Dispersion interaction 0.063 -0.336*** 0.409** 0.547*** 0.045 -0.499*** 0.757*** 0.483***
(0.486) (-2.909) (2.291) (3.529) (0.322) (-4.014) (3.341) (2.628)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes no no no no
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 72365 72365 34867 34867 2314 2314 1598 1598
No. clusters 346 346 329 329 315 315 288 288
R2 .076 .079 .100 .110 .047 .054 .048 .043
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on
standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L), ln(M/L),
ln(E/L) and ln(P/L). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: Productivity Dispersion and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Exports to
Each Country; Interaction with Di¤erent Headquarter-intensity Quintiles) (HS6-Country Level)
Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Headquarter intensity measure: skill equipment skill equipment
Dispersion 0.023 0.022 0.087*** 0.073***
(1.265) (1.226) (2.985) (2.950)
Dispersion interacted with:
Ii1 0.008 0.191*** 0.163 0.007
(0.072) (2.911) (1.299) (0.088)
Ii2 0.118 0.108 0.003 0.013
(1.126) (1.192) (0.032) (0.146)
Ii3 0.088 0.074 -0.093 0.336
(0.759) (0.589) (-0.658) (1.576)
Ii4 -0.037 0.163 0.184* 0.430***
(-0.265) (1.478) (1.712) (2.821)
Ii5 0.067 -0.122 0.575*** 0.410***
(0.763) (-1.148) (3.181) (3.512)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quintile xed e¤ects no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 72365 72365 72365 72365 34867 34867 34867 34867
No. Clusters 346 346 346 346 329 329 329 329
R2 .076 .085 .079 .085 .032 .120 .110 .120
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L), ln(M/L),
ln(E/L) and ln(P/L). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 9: Productivity Dispersion and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Chinese
rms-export-based dispersion measure) (HS6-Country level)
Exports to Each Country
Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill equipment skill equipment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dispersion 0.107* 0.201*** 0.254*** -0.095***
(1.681) (6.778) (2.980) (-3.065)
Dispersion interaction -0.169 0.036 0.488*** 0.306**
(-1.660) (0.416) (4.013) (2.029)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes
N 72051 72051 34663 34663
No. clusters 340 340 327 327
R2 .120 .110 .110 .100
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on
standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L), ln(M/L),
ln(E/L) and ln(P/L). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 10: Contractual Completeness and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (HS6-
Country level)
Exports to Each Country Exports to the USA
Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill equipment skill equipment skill equipment skill equipment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contractibility -0.062 0.044 -0.056 -0.023 -0.042 0.030 -0.156 0.020
(-0.561) (1.053) (-0.410) (-0.416) (-0.355) (0.612) (-1.050) (0.370)
Contractibility interaction 0.009 -0.298*** -0.146 0.191 0.047 -0.301*** -0.303 0.100
(0.068) (-3.167) (-0.731) (1.405) (0.311) (-2.600) (-1.491) (0.783)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes no no no no
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 58967 58967 26416 26416 1858 1858 1232 1232
No. clusters 279 279 263 263 251 251 226 226
r2 .081 .088 .088 .090 .050 .057 .014 .010
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on
standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L), ln(M/L),
ln(E/L) and ln(P/L). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 11: Contractual Completeness and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Exports
to Each Country, Interaction with Di¤erent Headquarter-intensity Quintiles) (HS6-Country level)
Import-and-assembly Pure-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill equipment skill equipment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contractibility interacted with:
Ii1 -0.147* -0.001 0.214* -0.018
(-1.968) (-0.013) (1.899) (-0.290)
Ii2 -0.043 0.138*** -0.024 -0.043
(-0.704) (2.862) (-0.373) (-0.828)
Ii3 0.077 -0.038 -0.070 0.139*
(1.514) (-0.760) (-0.905) (1.828)
Ii4 -0.087 -0.132** 0.094 -0.003
(-0.921) (-2.040) (1.333) (-0.052)
Ii5 -0.075 -0.230*** 0.098 -0.071
(-1.378) (-2.843) (1.015) (-0.588)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Quintile xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes
N 58967 58967 26416 26416
No. Clusters 279 279 263 263
R2 .088 .095 .100 .110
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports as a share of total exports under each trade regime. An
observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on
standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L), ln(M/L),
ln(E/L) and ln(P/L). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A1 - Summary Statistics of the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants Across HS6 Categories
Trade regime 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean #Obs.
Import-and-assembly 0 0.598 0.923 1 1 0.746 3627
Pure-assembly 0 0 0.264 0.797 1 0.392 2880
Table A2 - Summary Statistics of Headquarter Intensity Measures (Across SIC 4-digit)
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean # of SIC categories.
Skill Intensity -1.330 -1.165 -0.973 -0.757 -0.557 -0.966 451
Capital Intensity 0.224 0.564 0.920 1.330 1.852 0.976 451
Equipment Intensity -0.374 -0.015 0.425 0.910 1.465 0.487 451
Structure Intensity -0.717 -0.471 -0.128 0.339 0.789 -0.034 451
Material Intensity 0.378 0.665 1.025 1.423 1.904 1.092 451
R&D Intensity -6.269 -5.331 -4.474 -3.677 -3.012 -4.585 414
Contractibility 0.209 0.307 0.507 0.712 0.828 0.513 361
ln(college emp/emp) Chinese plants -3.069 -2.669 -2.273 -1.819 -1.437 -2.250 513
ln(high-sch emp/emp) Chinese plants -1.179 -1.031 -0.797 -0.618 -0.418 -0.811 513
ln(real value K/real Y) Chinese plants -1.336 -1.082 -0.814 -0.563 -0.086 -0.768 513
R&D + Advert. Intensity Chinese plants -7.051 -6.575 -5.949 -5.246 -4.493 -5.857 458
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